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CHAPTER 11 
Evidence 
M. ROBERT DUSHMAN* 
§11.1. Prior Consistent Statements: Fresh Complaint. Courts in 
most jurisdictions,! including Massachusetts,2 hold that a witness's 
prior consistent statement is not admissible where it is offered to cor-
roborate his testimony. The reason for this rule is that if offered to 
prove the truth of the matters asserted3 the out-of-court statement is 
hearsay, and if the statement is offered merely to show the witness's 
consistency4 it is not relevant until the witness has been impeached by 
evidence of recent fabrication or bias. However, in cases involving 
sexual assaults, courts routinely admit evidence that the victim had 
complained of the crime shortly after its commission even where the 
victim has not been expressly impeached.5 This exception is generally 
known as the "fresh complaint" doctrine. 6 In two decisions during the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court reconsidered the rationale 
and scope of the fresh complaint exception as applied in Mas-
sachusetts. 7 
Historically, the fresh complaint doctrine represents "a perverted 
survival of the ancient requirement that [the victim] should make hue 
and cry" to arouse the neighborhood. 8 As a result, during the early 
development of the doctrine, proof of the victim's fresh complaint was 
a necessary element of the prosecution'S case.9 Although the notion of 
"hue and cry" has long since disappeared, the doctrine has neverthe-
*M. ROBERT DUSHMAN is an associate in the law firm of Brown, Rudnick, Freed & 
Gesmer, Boston. 
§II.I.'See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1124, at 255 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. 
2 Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 846, 85(), 345 N.E.2d 690, 693. 
3 MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251, at 604 (2d ed. 1972). 
4 See text and notes at 18-22 infra. 
5 See Commonwealth v. Hanger, 357 Mass. 464, 466, 258 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1970); 
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 629, 67 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1946). 
6 See text and notes at 13-17 and 23-28 infra. 
7 Commonwealth v. Blow, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1437, 348 N.E.2d 794; Common-
wealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420,348 N.E.2d 746. 
B Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 1427 n.7, 348 N.E.2d 746, 750 
p.7; Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176,51 N.E. 746,746 (1898). 
9 Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176, 51 N.E. 746, 746 (1898). 
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less survived but in a permissive rather than a mandatory form.Io 
Wigmore has identified three different rationales which have been 
advanced to explain the survival of this ancient doctrine. The dif-
ferent features of these separate theories, in turn, account for varia-
tions in the application of the fresh complaint exception among vari-
ous jurisdictions. 11 
One approach adopted by only a few jurisdictions12 is to admit evi-
dence of a fresh complaint under the excited utterance exception to 
the hearsay rule.13 To be admitted under this theory, the victim's 
complaint must have been virtually contemporaneous with the 
offense. I4 However, once the proponent has established that the com-
plaint evinces the requisite spontaneity, "the hearsay is admitted for its 
own sake."u Accordingly, there is no further requirement that the vic-
tim also have appeared as a witness or, if a witness, that she have been 
impeached. I6 Furthermore, the details, as well as the fact that the 
complaint was made, are admitted into evidence and may be used tes-
timonialIy.I7 
The second approach like the first also involves an application of a 
recognized hearsay exception. It admits the fresh complaint for the 
purpose of rehabilitating a witness who has been expressly 
impeached. I8 Several different consequences follow from the re-
10 See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 1427 n.7, 348 N.E.2d 746, 
750 n.7. 
" 4 WIGMORE, supra note I, §§ 1134-1140, at 297-314. 
il The Massachusetts courts have not chosen to rely on this approach. See Common-
wealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176-77,51 N.E. 746,746-47 (1898). 
13 4 WIGMORE, supra note I, § 1139, at 313; 6 WIGMORE, supra note I, § 1761, at 
242-43. See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 1430 n.12, 348 N.E.2d 
746, 751 n.12. 
14 E.g., Cook v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (victim's 
complaint made to husband within one hour of sexual assault admissible; complaint 
made to police officer six hours later was clearly not a part of the res gestae). The 
rationale for this requirement is the supposition that complaints made impulsively while 
still under the influence of a terrifying event are likely to be inherently truthful and 
will not reflect the influence of afterthought or deliberate design. /d. 
15 4 WIGMORE,supra note I, § 1139, at 314. 
18 See, e.g., State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 526, 40 N.W.2d 347, 348 (1949); State v. 
Godwin, 51 N.M. 65, 71-72,178 P.2d 584-88 (1947). 
17 See, e.g., Hooks v. State, 215 Ga. 869, 872, 114 S.E.2d 6, 9 (1960); Commonwealth 
v. Cupps, 157 Pa. Super. 341, 342-44, 43 A.2d 545, 546-47 (1945). 
The admission of such details as testimonial evidence highlights one central weakness 
of this approach which may have prevented it from gaining more widespread applica-
tion. In situations where there is no other evidence of an assault, to accept the state-
ment as substantive evidence commits "the error of accepting [the victim's] statement as 
itself evidence of the very facts which should first be otherwise shown in order to make 
the declarations spontaneous." 6 WIGMORE, supra note I, § 1761, at 245-46. In most 
situations where the res gestae exception is the vehicle for the admission of evidence, 
there is some circumstantial evidence of the occurrence of the startling event. /d., at 
245. Circumstantial proof, however, may not be probative in the context of a sex crime 
as, for example, where there is evidence of intercourse, but no evidence bearing on the 
issue of the victim's consent. /d., at 246. 
18 4 WIGMORE,Supra note 1, §§ 1137-38, at 311-12. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/15
300 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 11.1 
habilitative rationale of this approach. First, the victim must be in a 
position where evidence of the fresh complaint will rehabilitate her. 
Thus, the declarant actually must have been a witness,19 and she must 
have been impeached.20 Second, because the fresh complaint will re-
habilitate an impeached witness only if the substance of her earlier 
version comports with that given on the stand, the details as well as 
the fact of the prior complaint must be admitted. 21 There is, however, 
no further requirement that the complaint must have been fresh, ex-
cept that it must have preceded the asserted impeaching fabrication, 
bias, or inducement.22 
In contrast to the first two theories, the third rationale for the ad-
mission of evidence of a fresh complaint is not so easily categorized as 
a recognized hearsay exception. This third approach, which is the one 
Massachusetts courts primarily adopt, begins with the assumption that 
a person victimized by a sexual assault would promptly complain.23 In 
effect, therefore, the failure to make a fresh complaint is inconsistent 
with a subsequent willingness to bring charges and to testify in court, 
and thus allows the trier of fact to assume that no assault occurred. 
Accordingly, under this theory, the past complaint is admitted "as in a 
sense corroborating the testimony of the complainant, by showing that 
[the victim's] conduct immediately after the episode was consistent 
with her charge of rape."24 The corroborative rationale resembles the 
rehabilitative one in that they apply only where the victim has taken 
the stand, both theories being premised on a notion of allowing the 
victim to rely on evidence of the fresh complaint to rebut an inconsis-
tency arising as the result of her in-court testimony.25 There are, 
19ld. § 1138, at 311. 
20 The exact nature of this further requirement may be differently conceived. In 
some jurisdictions, for example, courts will admit prior consistent statements simply to 
rebut evidence that an inconsistent statement was made. See, e.g., Felice v. Long Island 
R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); 4 WIGMORE. supra 
note I, § 1126, at 260-62. Massachusetts, on the other hand, limits the admissibility of 
prior consistent statements to cases involving claims that the witness's in-court testimony 
was the product of bias or inducement. See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1420, 1423 n.3, 348 N.E.2d 746, 748 n.3; Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 846, 851-52, 345 N.E.2d 690, 693; Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 350 Mass. 
48,51-52, 213 N.E.2d 399, 402, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966). 
21 4 WIGMORE. supra note I, § 1138, at 311. 
22 State v. Werner, 16 N.D. 83, 90, 112 N.W. 60, 62 (1907). 
23See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 1425, 348 N.E.2d 746, 
749; Commonwealth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263, 265, 230 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176-77,51 N.E. 746, 746 (1898); 4 WIGMORE. supra 
note 1, § 1135, at 298. "This apparently irregular process of negativing evidence not yet 
formally introduced by the opponent" has been "fully sanctioned" by the courts. !d., at 
300. Similarly, even where the prosecution concedes the victim's failure to make a com-
plaint, the delay may be explained away as the result of shame, fear, or want of 
opportunity.ld., at 301. 
24 Commonwalth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263, 265, 230 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1967) . 
•• Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 177, 51 N.E. 746, 746-47 (1898); 4 
WIGMORE. supra note 1, § 1136, at 307-11. 
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however, differences in the applications of the corroborative and re-
habilitative theories. Such differences stem from the fact that the cor-
roborative rationale is aimed at rebutting an assumed inconsistency 
created by the victim's prior silence, whereas the rehabilitative ap-
proach is directed at rebutting an express inconsistency resulting from 
the victim's prior inconsistent statements. Thus, since the corrobora-
tive approach, unlike the rehabilitative one, is not conditioned on a 
showing of an actual inconsistency, it does not require that the witness 
have been expressly impeached.26 Furthermore, whereas the entire 
statement is admitted under the rehabilitative rationale, most jurisdic-
tions employing the corroborative theory will not admit the details of 
the complaint since the mere fact of a complaint is sufficient to rebut 
the implied inconsistency.27 However, some jurisdictions employing 
the corroborative theory do not apply the rule in the same manner. 
Massachusetts, for example, adopts the minority rule and will admit 
the details as well as the fact of a complaint.28 
26 4 WIGMORE, supra note I, § 1136, at 311. 
27 [d., at 307. See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 348 N.E.2d 
746, where the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that "the so called 'majority' rule 
permits only the following: 'on the direct examination the practice has been merely to 
ask whether she made complaint ... and to receive in answer only a simple yes or no.' " 
[d. at 1427, 348 N.E.2d at 750 (footnote omitted), quoting Woods v. State, 233 Ind. 320, 
326, 119 N.E.2d 558, 562 (1954). There is, however, some conflict in the jurisdictions 
as to what "details" must be excluded under the "majority" rule. Compare People v. Bur-
ton, 55 Cal.2d 328, 351-52, 359 P.2d 433, 443-44, II Cal. Rptr. 65, 75-76 (1961) 
("[Allleged victim's statement of the nature of the offense and the identify of the as-
serted offender, without details, is proper.") and State v. Twyford, 85 S.D. 522, 527, 
186 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1971) ("The name of complainant and the name of the alleged 
perpetrator, are not "details.") with People v. Fryman, 4 III.2d 224, 228, 122 N.E.2d 
573, 576 (1954) (details and name of assailant excluded) and State v. McLemore, 99 
Kan. 777, 779-80, 164 P.161, 162 (1917) (assailant's name must not be stated, but its 
admission is not prejudicial error where there is no question concerning the assailant's 
identity). 
For cases admitting the details as well as the facts of the case, see State v. Purvis, 157 
Conn. 198,207-08,251 A.2d 178, 182 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); State v. 
Crissman, 60 Ohio Op.2d 279, 281, 287 N.E.2d 642, 646 (County Ct. App. 1971). 
Wigmore does not indicate that any jurisdictions expressly adopt what would amount to 
a bona fide minority position in admitting the details of a fresh complaint under the 
corroborative rationale, but rather notes that "[al few courts have erroneously allowed 
the detailed statement to be used even when proceeding upon the [corroborativel 
theory; but these rulings are probably due to a confusion of the [corroborative and 
rehabilitativel theor[iesl." 4 WIGMORE, supra note I, § II36, at 310 n.1. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's adherence to the "minority" rule would not appear 
to result from such a confusion. The Court appears explicitly to recognize the distinc-
tions between the three different rationales that may be utilized to justify the admission 
of a fresh complaint. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 
1423 n.3, 1425, 1427 n.9, 1430, 348 N.E.2d 746, 748 n.3, 749, 750 n.9, 751. Further-
more, the Court's recognition that the "majority" rule would not admit the details in-
dicates that its adoption of the alternative approach is not the product of inadvertence. 
Id. at 1424, 348 N.E.2d at 749. 
28 Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 1424, 348 N.E.2d 746, 749; 
Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58, 12 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1937); see Commonwealth v. 
Hanger, 357 Mass. 464, 466, 258 N.E.2d 555, 555 (1970). 
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The development of the Massachusetts rule can be traced to a lead-
ing case where Justice Holmes recognized and adopted the common 
law practice of admitting the prior complaint, without there having 
been express impeachment, "for the ... general purpose of confirm-
ing the testimony of the [victim]."29 However, the Court in that case 
did not reach the issue of whether to admit the details as well as the 
facts of the complaint, for it did "not appear that more was admitted 
than the fact that the [victim] made complaint."30 The question of the 
admissibility of the details was first addressed several years later in a 
civil case in which the Court stated, U[w]here, as in this Common-
wealth, evidence as to such complaints is admitted for the purpose of 
corroborating the testimony of the complainant, the whole of the 
statement made by her, including the details, is admissible."31 It is not 
clear from the opinion whether the parties had actually raised the 
admissibility of the details, or whether the quoted statement was mere 
dictum. In either event, the Court provided very little support for its 
statement. For authority, the Court relied mainly upon just one Mas-
sachusetts case32 and a reference to Wigmore,33 neither of which sup-
ported the Court's statement. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts rule has 
been regarded as established ever since.34 During the Survey year, 
criminal defendants in two cases35 attacked the Massachusetts adher-
ence to the minority position and urged the Supreme Judicial Court 
to modify its rule by placing limitations on the admissibility of the de-
tails of the complaint. 
In the first case, Commonwealth v. Bailey,36 the defendant broke into 
the home of a retired school teacher and raped her. After the defen-
dant left, the woman ran to a neighbor's house for help. She first de-
scribed the incident to the neighbor and then repeated the story, on 
the morning after the incident, to the state policewoman who visited 
her in the hospital. At trial in the superior court, the victim described 
the attack, and then her neighbor and her sister testified without ob-
jection as to the victim's description of the attack shortly after it 
occurred.37 When the trial court allowed the state policewoman to tes-
tify to the account that the victim had given at the hospital, the de-
fendant objected and took exception.38 
2. Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 177,51 N.E. 746, 746 (1898). 
30ld. at 175, 51 N.E. at 746. 
31 Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58, 12 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1937). 
32 Commonwealth v. Gangi, 243 Mass. 341, 137 N.E. 643 (1923). 
33299 Mass. at 58, 12 N.E.2d at 196, citing J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1138 (2d ed. 
1923). For a discussion of Wigmore's stance on the admissibility of details under the 
corroborative approach, see text at note 27 supra. 
3. See cases ated at note 28 supra. 
3. Commonwealth v. Blow, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1437, 348 N.E.2d 794; Common-
wealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420,348 N.E.2d 746. 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1420, 348 N.E.2d 746. The facts of the case appear in 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1421-23, 348 N.E.2d at 747-48. 
37 [d. at 1425, 348 N.E.2d at 749. 
38/d. at 1423, 348 N.E.2d at 748. 
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In appealing his conviction,39 the defendant argued that the court 
should not have allowed the policewoman to testify as to the details of 
the victim's statement because the corroborative rationale, as applied 
by the majority of American jurisdictions, justifies the admission of 
only the fact of the complaint.40 Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the judgment belowY Despite the facial logic and im-
pressive scholarly support behind the defendant's position, the Court 
rejected it and chose to retain the established Massachusetts rule 
which admits the details of a fresh complaint as part of the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief in order to corroborate the victim's court tes-
timony.42 The Court, however, did not rationalize its result m'erely on 
the grounds of stare decisis. Instead, after a careful analysis of the 
merits and justification of the rule, the Court determined that a more 
common sense approach warranted the retention of the Massachusetts 
rule. 
The Supreme Judicial Court approached the issue by balancing the 
disadvantages of admitting the full details of the victim's statement 
against the benefits to be gained. On one hand, the Court found that 
the disadvantages were minimal, as several factors suggested that the 
Massachusetts rule "does not involve an unfair loading of the case 
against the defendant."43 To the extent that the details of the prior 
statement were consistent with the victim's trial testimony, the Court 
concluded that their admission would be merely cumulative;44 and to 
the extent that they were inconsistent, the admission of the prior 
statement actually might benefit a defendant who could use the dis-
crepancy to discredit the victim. 45 Moreover, the Court emphasized 
that the details of the prior complaint may be admitted in any event 
on redirect examination if the defendant has impeached the victim by 
attributing an inconsistency to alleged bias or recent contrivance.46 
Suggesting that a complaint is most likely to have a significant bearing 
39 The defendant subsequently was convicted in the superior court on indictments 
charging him with rape and assault to commit rape, G.L. c. 265, §§ 22, 24, and with 
breaking and entering a dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony, G.L. c. 
266, § 14. 
40 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1425, 348 N.E.2d at 749. The defendant appealed his con-
viction under the provisions of G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. The Supreme Judicial Court 
granted direct review under G.L. c. 211A, § IO(a). 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1420, 348 
N.E.2d at 747. 
41 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1423, 1436, 438 N.E.2d at 748, 754 . 
• 2 [d. at 1426, 348 N.E.2d at 750. As an alternative ground for its holding, the Court 
noted "that, even if [it] accepted the defendant's argument, [it] would conclude that the 
admission of the policewoman's testimony, with its detail, was nonprejudicial and harm-
less in the present case." [d. at 1425, 348 N.E.2d at 749. Following as it did the tes-
timony of the victim, the victim's neighbor, and the victim's sister, the policewoman's 
testimony was thought to constitute "a noncontroversial, largely inconspicuous and re-
dundant segment of the trial." [d. at 1426, 348 N.E.2d at 749 (footnote omitted). 
43 [d. at 1429, 348 N.E.2d at 751. 
•• See id. at 1425-26, 1429, 348 N.E.2d at 749, 751. See note 33 supra. 
45 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1430, 348 N.E.2d at 751. 
48 [d. 
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in the same cases which are likely to involve charges of impeachment 
on grounds of bias or recent contrivance,47 the Court thus minimized 
the effect of its rule by describing its practical effect as being merely 
to shift the time of introduction of the evidence.48 Furthermore, 
whether the fresh complaint was consistent or inconsistent with the 
victim's trial testimony, two additional factors limited any potential 
prejudice to the defendant that might result from the admission of 
the details of the complaint. First, the prosecution could make only 
limited use of the testimony because the complaint is admitted for 
corroborative purposes only and may not be used to fill gaps in the 
prosecution's case.49 Second, where the jury might be influenced by 
"needless rehearsal of the particulars of a gruesome crime" or where 
the testimony might become unduly repetitious, the judge may limit 
the testimony in his discretion. 50 The combined effect of these factors, 
therefore, suggested that there was little practical disadvantage to ad-
mitting the victim's entire statement. 
In contrast to these minimal disadvantages, however, the Court 
found that the benefits of admitting the details of the statement were 
substantial. Indeed, the Court determined that the mere fact of a 
complaint was too "perfunctory a reference ... to achieve the intrinsic 
[corroborative] purpose of the [fresh complaint] doctrine."51 To admit 
the details, the Court reasoned, was to admit "proof of [the victim's] 
condition, demeanor and verbal expressions," which evidence alone 
could enable the jury to form a reliable opinion with respect to 
whether in fact the woman's conduct was consistent with her 
testimony. 52 Furthermore, in a more general sense, the Court deter-
mined that adherence to its past practice would assist the rape victim 
who is often handicapped in prosecuting her complaint by humiliating 
in-court innuendos which abet the inordinate skepticism with which 
juries tend to approach such cases. 53 In essence, then, both the 
Court's approach-balancing the equities-as well as its result, follow 
the present trend54 of modifying the rules of evidence in trials of sex-
ual assault. 
47 Id. ("cases where consent or the like is suggested"). 
,sld. 
'Bld. at 1429, 348 N.E.2d at 751. 
5·ld. at 1431,348 N.E.2d at 752. 
"/d. at 1428, 348 N.E.2d at 750. 
52Id., 348 N.E.2d at 750-51, quoting The Queen v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 167, 
177-78. "To limit the evidence ... to [the mere fact of the complaint] is to ask the jury 
to draw important inferences from imperfect materials, perfect materials being at hand 
and in the cognizance of the witness in the box." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1429, 348 
N.E.2d at 751, quoting The Queen v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 167, 177-78. 
53 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1427 n.9, 1430-31, 348 N.E.2d at 750 n.9, 751-52 (noting 
discrepancy between judge and jury in rape cases). 
5' See generally Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is it the solution' 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 463 
(1975); Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 1551 (1975). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court took a similar approach, elevating 
common sense considerations over legal niceties, in the related case of 
Commonwealth v. Blow. 55 Decided the same day as Bailey, Blow involved 
a defendant charged with other crimes in addition to rape, and a 
fresh complaint that encompassed all the alleged offenses. 56 In Blow, 
the complainant, the defendant, and a companion of the defendant 
met each other in a bar.57 When the bar closed, the three of them left 
together, taking a taxi cab to a used car lot. There the two men took 
the complainant's pocketbook and the defendant engaged in inter-
course with her. After the men had fled, the complainant went to a 
nearby phone both and telephoned the cab company. When a cab ar-
rived, she went to the cab company office where she told the dis-
patcher that she had been raped and robbed. Taken to the police sta-
tion, she there made a similar statement and then identified the de-
fendant and his companion from a photographic line-up. 
After the complainant had testified at the trial, the dispatcher took 
the stand and related the statements made by the complainant in the 
cab company's office.58 The trial court admitted the entire statement 
over objection of defense counsel. 59 When acquitted of rape but con-
victed of unarmed robbery,60 the defendant appealed to the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 61 
In challenging his conviction, defendant did not mount a frontal at-
tack on the Massachusetts fresh complaint doctrine, as Bailey had 
done, rather he contended that the Massachusetts rule, admitting the 
details of a fresh complaint to corroborate a complainant's court tes-
55 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1437,348 N.E. 2d 794. 
56Id at 1437-39, 348 N.E.2d at 795. As the Court noted, this was also true in Bailey, 
but in that case the defendant made no special point of it. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1425 n.4, 348 N.E.2d at 749 n.4. 
57 The facts of the case appear in 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1437-39, 348 N.E.2d at 
795-96. There was conflicting testimony as to the nature of this encounter. The com-
plainant testified that she arrived at the bar shortly before closing time to buy beer and 
as she was leaving, the "two men rushed up behind her and jumped into the cab with 
her." Id. at 1438, 348 N.E.2d at 795. Other testimony introduced by defendant in-
dicated that complainant arrived around midnight and had already been drinking very 
heavily. Id. at 1437, 348 N.E.2d at 795. According to this version, there was much 
"laughing and kidding," including an attempt by the complainant to entice the de-
fendant's companion into the ladies' room, as well as a dispute over whether the com-
panion's recollection of prior sexual encounter with the complainant was correct. Id. 
58Id. at 1439-40, 348' N.E.2d at 796. This direct testimony was that "[s]he had said 
that she had been raped and robbed" and that she had said that the defendant and his 
companion" 'had taken her out into a car in this parking lot and taken her pocketbook 
away from her, [and] took the money out.' And she had said that the 'small guy [the 
defendant] had taken her clothes off and raped her.' " Id., quoting from the transcript 
of the trial. 
5.!d. at 1440, 348 N.E.2d at 796. 
60 !d. at 1437, 348 N.E.2d at 795. The rape indictment had been issued pursuant to 
G.L. c. 265, § 22; the unarmed robbery indictment pursuant to G.L. c. 265, § 19. 
61 Defendant appealed under the provisions of G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, and direct 
review was granted by the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211A, § JO(a). 
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timony, should be qualified in the situation where a defendant is 
charged with a second crime in addition to rape; and the fresh com-
plaint covers both offenses.82 The Supreme Judicial Court, however, 
refused "thus to abandon or modify [its] basic rule in the particular 
situation,"83 and affirmed the judgment below.84 
In reaching its result, the Court, much as it had done in Bailey, fo-
cused on the practical implications of the defendant's suggested mod-
ification of the fresh complaint rule.85 Initially, the court examined 
the possible alternatives for effectuating a modification of the rule in 
cases involving multiple offenses, finding subs~ntial drawbacks in 
each. The defendant's proposed solution, for example, which was to 
admit the details concerning the rape and exclude those pertaining to 
the robbery. was unsatisfactory because it necessitated an impractical 
separation of the facts intrinsic to both offenses.88 Furthermore, in 
situations where a victim would naturally mention both crimes in de-
scribing the incident, admission of only half of the statement might 
tend to discredit the victim's testimony since the jury might infer re-
cent fabrication from the failure to mention both crimes.87 
A second possible modification examined by the Court-limiting 
testimony to the fact that a complaint of sexual assault was 
made-posed the same problems as permitting only a restrictive 
corroboration.8s Furthermore, that solution was indefensible for creat-
ing "the anomaly that the evidence that could be called in support of 
a prosecution for rape would be diminished when the circumstances 
were allegedly aggravated."89 A third approach-having the prosecu-
tion forego admission of complaint evidence altogether when a de-
fendant Was charged with multiple crimes-was similarly flawed. 70 
While a fourth alternative-severing the trials for the different 
offenses-might relieve some of these problems, the Court concluded 
that such an alternative generated still other unacceptable results. 71 
82 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1440, 348 N.E.2d at 796. More particularly, defendant 
maintained that admission of the fresh complaint doctrine was "especially improper" in 
this case because, as it turned out, he had been acquitted of the rape charge. Id. at 
1441,348 N.E.2d at 796. 
II /d. at 1442, 348 N.E.2d at 797 (footnote omitted). 
84ld. at 1447, 348 N.E.2d at 799. 
85 In addition, as in Bailey, see note 42 sllJWa, the Court also adduced an alternative 
ground for its opinion: even if the trial court had erred in admitting the testimony, it 
was not prejudicial er.ror and "hardly ground for reversal." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1441, 348 N.E.2d at 796. Not only were the dispatcher's statements merely cumulative 
of complainant'S testimony, not unduly graphic or colorful, and appropriately subjected 
to a limiting instruction, but the jury in fact had "reached a conclusion contrary to that 
su~sted by the testimony of fresh complaint." Id. 
e 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1442, 348 N.E.2d at 797. 
Ifld. 
Slid. at 1442-43, 348 N.E.2d at 797. 
sSld.at 1443, 348 N.E.2d at 797. 
7°ld. 
7l1d. 
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In view of the substantial disadvantages inherent in any possible 
modification of the fresh complaint doctrine, the Court concluded 
that the benefits to be gained by any such modification paled in com-
parision with the very real benefit of "maintaining a uniform rule that 
applies as well in instances of multiple charges (which must represent 
a sizeable fraction of all cases in which rape is charged)."72 Moreover, 
the costs of such a uniform rule in terms of any substantial likelihood 
of prejudice to the defendant were minimal. 73 Indeed, in a direct 
parallel to its analysis in Bailey, the Court reasoned that a fresh com-
plaint encompassing related crimes was likely to be merely cumulative 
of the victim's trial testimony and, where it was not simply repetitive 
of such testimony, the discrepancy actually might work in the 
defendant's favor. 74 Furthermore, in the case of a particularly in-
flammatory complaint, the judge could exercise his discretion by 
adopting cautionary measures. 75 One such cautionary measure, which 
the Court explicitly approved, was the giving of an instruction, if the 
defendant so requests, that the complaint should be considered only 
in connection with the rape charge and, even then, should be used 
only for the purposes of corroboration.76 
Thus, both Bailey and Blow afforded the Supreme Judicial Court an 
important opportunity to reaffirm and explain its continuing adher-
ence to the minority rule which admits the details of a fresh complaint 
as part of the case-in-chief to corroborate the testimony of a rape vic-
tim. The significance of both opinions, however, lies not in legal 
niceties or in any rigid deference to past precedent. On the contrary, 
in each case the Court demonstrated its tendency to approach the 
evidentiary issues arising in rape cases from a practical perspective in-
formed by judicial sensitivity to the special problems confronting the 
rape victim who prosecutes her assailant. 
§ 11.2. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: Declarations of Co-
Conspirators, Excited Utterances, and the Innominate Category: 
Nonhearsay Declarations. In contrast to its broad approach to the 
evidentiary problems of the fresh complaint doctrine in the Bailey and 
Blow cases,! a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court took a much 
narrower and more cautious approach in Commonwealth v. White, 2 with 
respect to three other exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
72 [d. 
73/d. 
74 [d. See text at notes 43-45 supra. 
75 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1444, 348 N.E.2d at 797. 
76 As noted by the Court, this is the procedure adopted by Connecticut which, like 
Massachusetts, admits the details of the complaint to corroborate the victim's in-court 
testimony. [d. at 1443-44, 348 N.E.2d at 797, citing State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 
207-08,251 A.2d 178, 182 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969). 
§ 11.2. 1 See § 11.1 supra. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1921, 352 N.E.2d 904. Justice Braucher dissented. [d. at 1938, 
352 N.E.2d at 912. 
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The White case arose out of a brief encounter between a white man, 
the complaining witness Thomas Slade, and two black youths in 
Roslindale. 3 According to Slade's testimony,4 two youths accosted him 
and demanded money. The pair took five one-dollar bills from him 
and then fled.s Slade immediately enlisted the aid of some friends to 
search the, neighborhood for the robbers. Soon they came upon the 
defendant and her companion Danny Gilbert,6 who ran in opposite di-
rections when Slade shouted at them. Although Slade stumbled and 
fell, certain of his friends chased the pair and quickly apprehended 
Gilbert, who surrendered without a struggle and handed over five 
one-dollar bills, saying "I didn't do it. She did it."7 They then got into 
the car with Gilbert and returned to the parking lot where they had 
first seen the pair.s There they found Slade and the defendant who 
had been captured by some of the others. While the defendant consis-
tently denied having done anything,9 Gilbert turned to Slade and said 
"I'm sorry, man, I didn't mean it. I don't blame you for being mad."lo 
As the defendant continued to deny any part in the robbery, the 
central factual issue at her trial concerned the identity of the two ,rob-
bers. In effect, the defense sought to suggest to the jury that the case 
was one of mistaken identity, arising when Slade and his friends sim-
ply seized upon the first black couple they saw after the robbery.u 
The Commonwealth, however, introduced Gilbert's statements as in-
3 The facts of the case appear in 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1922-26, 352 N.E.2d at 
906-07. 
4 Compare the defendant's testimony as recounted at note 8 infra. 
5 Slade testified that Gilbert was brandishing a half-opened straight razor, while the 
defendant held a "shiny" object. One of them also apparently cut the victim's arm. 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1922,352 N.E.2d at 906. 
6 Gilbert, a juvenile, was not tried with the defendant. See id. 
7 [d. at 1924,352 N.E.2d at 907. 
S Gilbert continued to make similar statements in the car, on the way back to the 
parking lot. [d. 
o The defendant, however, did not deny her connection with Gilbert. On the con-
trary, when one of the men who had apprehended Gilbert exhibited the five one-dollar 
bills to Slade before giving them to one of the police officers who had arrived on the 
scene, she exclaimed, "That's his [Gilbert's] money [or ours]." [d. at 1925, 352 N.E.2d at 
907. 
10 [d. at 1924, 352 N.E.2d at 907. 
11 Id.at 1926, 352 N.E.2d at 907-08. According to this theory, Slade's in-court iden-
tification of the defendant was actually based on seeing her at the time of the capture, 
not at the time of the robbery. [d., 352 N.E.2d at 908. Because the original encounter 
was "very brief," it was reasonable to doubt Slade's ability to identify his assailants. See 
id. at 1922, 352 N .E.2d at 906. 
To support the mistaken identity argument, the defendant took the stand and tes-
tifed that she and Gilbert had left her house on the day in question with nine dollars to 
go to a bowling alley. After stopping to buy wine, they paused briefly in the liquor 
store's parking lot to watch some children sledding. As they were standing there, a car 
bore down upon them with a man leaning out a window shouting profanities with the 
word "nigger." They were scared and ran. Furthermore, she contended that she had 
not been wearing clothes matching the description Thomas had given the police. See id. 
at 1925-26,352 N.E.2d at 907. 
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culpating the defendant. 12 Over the defendant's objections and excep-
tions, the trial court admitted all of Gilbert's statements, relying on 
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 13 Furthermore, in 
denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, the trial court sug-
gested that the statements also might be admissible as excited 
utterances.14 On the defendant's appeal from her conviction,15 the 
Supreme Judicial Court, over Justice ~raucher's dissent, reversed and 
held that the admission of Gilbert's statements was prejudicial error 
requiring a new trial. 16 
Addressing first the trial court's reliance on the co-conspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, the Court characterized that exception as 
follows: "[W]here there is proof ... that two or more persons are en-
gaged in a common criminal enterprise, the acts and declarations of 
orie, during the enterprise and in furtherance of it, affect all."17 Ap-
plying this rule, the Court had no doubt that there was sufficient evi-
dence to indicate a joint venture to commit an a~sault and a robbery.18 
However, since the robbery itself was complete before Gilbert made 
his statement, the Court concentrated its inquiry on two other issues. 
First, the Court sought to determine whether the assailants' joint ven-
ture included the escape as well as the robbery, and second, if so, 
whether Gilbert's statements were made during the pendency and in 
furtherance of that joint venture.19 Conceding the first issue for the 
sake of argument, the Court nevertheless concluded that Gilbert's 
statements failed the second test because the "escape" attempt ended 
in frustration with Gilbert's capture and surrenaer just before he 
made his statements.20 Accordingly, the ·Court found that the prof-
12 [d. at 1926-27, 352 N.E.2d at 907-08. Neither side had called Gilbert as a witness. 
[d. 
13/d. at 1927, 352 N.E.2d at 908. See text at note 17 infra. Defense counsel also 
moved for a mistrial and objected to the appropriate portion of the judge'S charge to 
the jury. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1927,352 N.E.2d at 908. 
14·See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1933, 352 N.E.2d at 91O-1l. 
15 Defendant was convicted on indictments for armed robbery, for assault and battery 
with a dangerous weapon, and for unlawful possession of marijuana found on her after 
her arrest. [d. at 1921, 352 N.E.2d at 905-06. 
18 [d. at 1927, 352 N.E.2d at 908. The order reversed only the first two of 
defendant's three convictions. See note 15 supra. 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1927-28, 352 N.E.2d at 908 (footnote omitted), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pleasant, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1281, 1284-85,315 N.E.2d 874, 876. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1928,352 N.E.2d at 908. 
19 [d. The Court also raised, but did not decide, the "question whether, for purposes 
of the hearsay exception, the trier is entitled to assume that a joint venture to commit a 
crime necessarily includes a common undertaking to effect an escape .... " [d. at 1929, 
352 N.E.2d at 909. The Court suggested that the proponent of the out-of-court state-
ment in fact may have to establish the existence of a joint venture to escape by proving 
tw.() facts: (1) attempted escape by the participants in the crime; and (2) some element 
of collaboration between them. [d. Because both elements were present in White, there 
was no necessity for the Court to resolve the broader issue of the viability of the pre-
sumption. [d. 
20 The Commonwealth had argued that the "escape" continued because of the possi-
bility that Gilbert might have anticipated being released on returning the money and 
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fered evidence failed to satisfy 'the conditions of the co-conspirator 
exception.21 
In thus rejecting the trial court's reliance on the co-conspirator ex-
ception, the Court explained that it was not interpreting the rule with 
an "impractical strictness." On the contrary, exclusion of Gilbert's 
statements was necessary to further the "significant policy" behind the 
exception.22 Only by insisting upon the continuation of a joint crimi-
. nal enterprise could one be assured of the minimal degree of reliabil-
ity necessary to justify imposing vicarious liability on a co-venturer.23 
The frustration of an enterprise reduces a declarant's reliability as his 
self-preservation interest tends to prevail over the interest of the 
common enterprise.24 
Having thus disposed of the primary basis for the trial court's rul-
ing, the Supreme Judicial Court similarly rejected the alternative con-
tention that Gilbert's statements were properly admitted as excited 
'utterances.25 First, the Court noted that the exciting event was the 
apprehension of Gilbert, but the statements related not to that event, 
but to the earli~r robbery.26 Second, it determined that statements 
which exculpate the speaker and inculpate another appear more cal-
culating than instinctive.27 Thus, the Court concluded that Gilbert's 
declarations were "quite different from the statements usually ac-
cepted under the [excited utterance] rubric."28 
Having thus found Gilbert's sl:?tements inadmissible under any pre-
viously recognized hearsay exception, the Court went on to consider 
the Commonwealth's suggestion that it should adopt a catchall "in-
minimizing his guilt.ld. at 1930, 352 N.E.2d at 909. The Court dismissed the argument 
as not justified on the facts. Moreover, if Gilbert's statements were in fact designed to 
aid his escape by minimizing his own guilt, he did so on his own, at the defendant's ex-
pense, and in no sense as part of a "common" plan of escape. Id. at 1930-31, 352 
N.E.2d at 909. 
21 /d., 352 N.E.2d at 910. 
22Id. at 1931-32, 352 N.E.2d at 910. 
23/d. at 1932, 352 N.E.2d at 910. The Court noted that "[t]he mutual 'agency,' con-
ceived to underlie a joint criminal venture, that justifies exposing one co-venturer to 
the risk of being incriminated by the utterances of another ... loses all reality when the' 
venture collapses, and the justification disappears with it." Id. (citation and footnote 
omitted). See Commonwealth v. Pleasant, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 128i, 1284, 315 N.E.2d 
874, 876. fL' 
24 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1932,352 N.E.2d at 910. 
25 It was not at all clear whether the trial court had relied on the excited utterance ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. See text at note 14 supra. 
261d. at 1933-34, 352 N .E.2d at 911. 
27/d. Since these two factors indicated that Gilbert's statements fell outside the excited 
utterance exception, the Court concluded that the customary deference to "the trier's 
discretion in deciding as to the closeness of the connection between the exciting event 
and the utterance [was] not pertinent." Id. The Court's refusal to affirm the trial court's 
ruling on this impliedly alternative ground prompted Justice Braucher to observe that: 
"So far as I can discover, this is the first time in our history that we have reversed a 
trial judge'S ruling in a criminal case on the admissibility of evidence as a spontaneous 
utterance." Id. at 1940, 352 N.E.2d at 912 (Braucher, j., dissenting). 
28/d. at 1934,352 N.E.2d at 911. 
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nominate" hearsay exception under which Gilbert's statements would 
be admissible. The Court characterized the proposed "innominate" 
exception as encompassing hearsay statements whose "admission 
would be in a large sense compatible with sundry recognized hearsay 
exceptions, and would be otherwise fair."29 The Court thus analogized 
it to the Federal Rules' catchall exception.30 Having so described the 
proposed exception, however, the Court found it unIlecessary to de-
cide whether to adopt it;31 for even under the Federal Rule, the 
Court found that Gilbert's statements would not be admissible. 32 
Under the Federal Rule, the trial court would have had to exclude 
Gilbert's hearsay statements unless it was satisfied that more probative 
evidence, such as Gilbert's live testimony, was not available; and the 
Commonwealth gave no explanation for not having ,called Gilbert as a 
witness.33 Additionally, the Federal Rule admits a hearsay declaration 
only if the trial court is reasonably satisfied as to its trustworthiness; 
and the majority was clearly suspicious of Gilbert's statements.34 
Justice Braucher, in dissent, conceded the "impeccable logic" of the 
majority's opinion, but challenged the very premises on which its logic 
was based. Rather than according the numerous exceptions a certain 
"magical quality," Justice Braucher advocated the adoption of a far 
more sweeping approach that would begin with the proposition "that 
hearsay is. admissible unless the trial judge in his or her sound discre-
tion thinks it fair to exclude it."35 
Applying his own formulation of the rule to the facts of the case, 
Justice Braucher also disagreed with the majority's characterization of 
the purpose for which the evidence was offered. Whereas the majority 
stated generally that the evidence was "offered to prove the truth of 
29Id. 
30 Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads in part: 
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing ex-
ceptions but having equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. 
3! The Court, hs:>wever, recognized the need for flexibility: "We agree that the hear-
say rule and its stated exceptions should not be regarded as a closed system without 
room for variations on reasoned grounds." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1934-35,352 N.E.2d 
at 911. 
32ld. at 1935-36,352 N.E.2d at 911. 
33 ld. For the text of Rule; 803(24), see note 30 supra. 
34See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1935, 352 N.E.2d at 911. Other factors militating 
against the application of the proposed innominate exception included the extension of 
the strong policy against admitting a co-venturer's statements after the frustration of 
the joint venture and the damaging nature of the statements which did not merely 
place defendant at the site of the crime, but put the knife in her hands. Id. 
30ld. at 1939, 352 N.E.2d at 912 (Braucher,]., dissenting), quoting Younger, In Praise 
of Simplicity, 62 A.B.A.]. 632, 634 (1976). 
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Gilbert's statements,"36 the dissent pointed out that they were "sig-
nificant [only] as corroboration of the victim's identification of the de-
fendant as one of those who robbed him. For any other purpose they 
were worthless, and their admission in evidence was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt."37 Focusing on this narrower significance of 
Gilbert's statements, Justice Braucher concluded that those statements 
lacked the testimonial defects which generally require the exclusion of 
hearsay, namely, the potential for ambiguity, faulty perception, er-
roneous memory, and Insincerity.3s 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Braucher paid particular atten-
tion to the problem that had so obviously troubled the majority: the 
potential for insincerity in Gilbert's pushing blame away from himself 
and casting it on the defendant. 39 Justice Braucher determined, how-
ever, that when Gilbert's statements were restricted to the corrobora-
tive purpose, the risk of insincerity was minimized because the state-
ment, especially when taken together with the surrender of the money, 
identified Gilbert as well as the defendant.40 As such, Gilbert's state-
ments were contrary to his own penal interest, and thus possessed suf-
ficient "indicia of reliability" to allay the majority's suspicions.41 Re-
garding the remaining requirements of the Federal Rule, Justice 
Braucher was not troubled by the Commonwealth's failure to call Gil-
bert as a witness or to explain its reasons for not doing so because if 
called as a witness Gilbert would undoubtedly have asserted his fifth 
ameQdment privilege not to testify.42 Having thus negated the poten-
tial hearsay problems, Justice Braucher concluded that Gilbert's 
statements were properly admitted for the purpose of corroborating 
the eye-witness identification of the defendant.43 
The White case is notable not only for the interplay between the 
majority and dissent approaches to the hearsay rule, but also for the 
failure of either opinion to consider a third approach that might have 
accommodated Justice Braucher's common sense result within the 
framework of existing hearsay rules. This third approach would avoid 
entirely the dispute over hearsay exceptions by recognizing that 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1927,352 N.E.2d at 908. 
37/d. at 1940, 352 N.E.2d at 913 (Braucher, j., dissenting). 
3. [d. at 1942, 352 N.E.2d at 913 (Braucher, j., dissenting), quoting Tribe, Triangu-
wting Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REV. 957,958 (1974). 
39 1976 Mass. Ad". Sh. at 1934,352 N.E. 2d at 911. Justice Braucher discounted any 
problems conceivably posed by the first three testimonial defects. [d. at 1942-43, 352 
N.E.2d at 914 (Braucher, j., dissenting). 
40 [d. at 1943, 352 N.E.2d at 914 (Braucher, j., dissenting). 
41 [d., quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
42 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1940, 352 N.E.2d at 913; see id. at 1943, 352 N.E.2d at 914 
(Braucher, j., dissenting), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970). 
43 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1943,352 N.E.2d at 914 (Braucher, j., dissenting). Justice 
Braucher further noted that even if the trial court had given erroneous reasons for its 
correct ruling, that in itself was not grounds for reversal. [d. To the extent that the trial 
court had admitted evidence for other purposes, it had committed merely harmless 
error. [d. 
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Gilbert's statements were not hearsay at all because they had not been 
offered for the truth of the matters asserted.44 Gilbert's statement that 
"she did it" was not introduced to prove that the defendant had done 
it. Similarly, his subsequent apology was not introduced to prove that 
Gilbert, in fact, was sorry. Instead, both statements were relevant only 
for the purpose of proving circumstantially that Gilbert had a guilty 
state of mind. 45 This, in turn, bore on the identity issue because the 
mere fact of his making the statements, irrespective of their truth, 
strongly suggested that he, and inferentially the defendant, his com-
panion, were not the innocent bystanders that the defense sought to 
establish. Because the statements were not offered to evidence the fact 
asserted, the trial court might have admitted both statements without 
relying on any exception to the hearsay rule. 46 
There is no indication in either the majority opinion or the dissent 
as to why none of the judges considered a non hearsay theory of ad-
missiblity. This omission is especially surprising in view of the fact that 
both opinions indicated an awareness of the circumstantial nature of 
the evidence. The dissent, especially, came very close to reaching this 
result, when it premised its approach on a recognition of the nontes-
timonial nature of Gilbert's statementsY While it concluded that those 
statements did not present the normal hearsay dangers, it did not take 
the final step of declaring that the statements were not hearsay. The 
majority also seemed sensitive to the importance of circumstantial 
identity evidence, for they recognized the admissibility of "Gilbert's act 
of surrendering the five dollars as distinguished from his declara-
tions."48 
One possible factor in the Court's preoccupation with the hearsay 
aspect of Gilbert's statements, and concomitant failure on the part of 
both opinions to consider their admissibility as nonhearsay evidence .. 
may be that the trial court admitted those statements without limita-
tion, allowing the jury to consider their testimonial effect. However, 
the trial court would have been required to limit Gilbert's statements 
to their circumstantial value only if the defendant had requested a 
limiting instruction,49 and it does not appear that she ever made such 
a request. Moreover, a concern with a limiting instruction would not 
account for the Court's failure to distinguish between the trial court's 
admission of both the statement-"I'm sorry, man, I didn't mean 
44 The hearsay rule only forbids the use of an out-of-court statement "as an assertion 
to evidence the fact asserted .... " 6 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1788, at 313 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1972). 
45 The hearsay rule does not apply when the utterance is introduced as circumstantial 
evidence. Id. See generally id. § 1790, at 320-26 (utterances as indicating circumstantially 
the speaker's own state of mind). 
46 See notes 44 and 45 supra. 
47 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1940,352 N.E.2d at 913. 
48Id. at 1931 n.9, 352 N.E.2d at 910 n.9. 
49 Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1429 n.ll, 348 N.E.2d at 751 
n.ll. 
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it."-whose substance was innocuous and the statement-"she did 
it"-whose substance was far more damaging. Even as to this last 
statement, however, it is doubtful whether the defendant was in fact 
prejudiced by the absence of a limiting instruction. Once it was 
established that the defendant and Gilbert were the robbers, it was 
immaterial which one of them actually "did it," since the other one 
would be fully liable vicariously.IIO 
In conclusion, then, the somewhat narrow approach of the White 
case contrasts sharply with the more flexible, policy-oriented results in 
the two "fresh complaint" cases, Bailey and Blow, discussed in the pre-
vious section. 51 In White, the Court adopted a more technical ap-
proach to hearsay exceptions which seems to have precluded consid-
eration of the nonhearsay aspects of the declarations in question. 
Furthermore, while Bailey and Blow clarified an important issue, the 
White case may have raised more questions than it resolved. 
10 See, e.g., G.L. c. 274, §§ 1,2. 
51 See § 11.1 supra. 
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